The critical role of banks in financial stability and their distinct nature compared to other industries within the economy necessitates an accurate and efficient supervisory in this field. A basic requirement for efficient supervision is supervisory authority independence from those under supervision, such that conflict of interest is prevented. Inspired by literature, to analyze the independence of the supervisory authority in Iran, the independence of the Iran Central Bank (CBI) from the banking industry is studied from three aspects: structural and organizational independence, financial and budgetary independence, and human resources independence. From the organizational and structural aspect, the role of the banking industry in the appointment of various organs and decision-making committees of CBI is examined. In the financial aspect, we first analyze how the remunerations of members of the CBI organs are determined. Then, according to the central bank's financial statements, benefit (loss) of the supervisory authority from the (un)healthy functioning of the banking industry, is analyzed. Finally, to study the independence of human resources, movement of personnel (known as "revolving door") and communications between managers and experts of the supervisory authority (CBI) and the banking industry will be examined. The literature on the independence of the supervisory authority shows that in many countries, various restrictions and transparency requirements are enacted regarding the movement of personnel between the supervisory authority and institutions under supervision. The development of private banks in Iran during the past two decades necessitates a careful study and implementation of international experiences in this regard.