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:: Volume 27, Issue 91 (Quarterly journal of economic research and policies 2019) ::
qjerp 2019, 27(91): 131-154 Back to browse issues page
How to Eliminate Collusion in Tenders and Auctions, using Game Theory (Determination of Ceiling and Floor Prices)
Salah Salimian * , Kiumars Shahbazi , Shahram Fattahi , Jalil Badpeyma
Urmia University , salahsalimian@yahoo.com
Abstract:   (3431 Views)
Governments and firms in accordance to their duties, obliged to inevitably contracts with Individuals and legal entities, especially in auction and tender process. Since, the law of conducting tenders and auctions is lacking efficiency and has major objection, therefore, this has led to the dissemination and development of areas of corruption in these contracts (through collusion). In this paper, in order to eliminate collusion, the Nash equilibrium points have been obtained by designing a static game and solving it using game theory. The results show the maximum of the ceiling prices, As well as the minimum of floor prices at which the bidder chooses to eliminate collusion between the two tenderers. At last, it is recommended that the governments and bidding firms use the results of this research and neutralize collusion by setting ceiling and floor prices.
Keywords: Game Theory, Nash Equilibrium, Collusion, Tender, Bidding
Full-Text [PDF 845 kb]   (1016 Downloads)    
Type of Study: Research | Subject: Special
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salimian S, shahbazi K, fattahi S, Badpeyma J. How to Eliminate Collusion in Tenders and Auctions, using Game Theory (Determination of Ceiling and Floor Prices). qjerp 2019; 27 (91) :131-154
URL: http://qjerp.ir/article-1-2101-en.html


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Volume 27, Issue 91 (Quarterly journal of economic research and policies 2019) Back to browse issues page
فصلنامه پژوهشها و سیاستهای اقتصادی Journal of Economic Research and Policies
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