Measuring Iran Central Bank De jure Independence In New Act

khosravi, meysam; Jamour, mohammad; Lotfi, Reza

doi:10.61186/qjerp.32.112.6

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Volume 32, Issue 112 (quarterly journal of economic research and policies 2025)

qjerp 2025, 32(112): 6-47

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Measuring Iran Central Bank De jure Independence In New Act

Meysam Khosravi ^*

, Mohammad Jamour

, Reza Lotfi

Faculty of Economics, University of Tehran , me.khosravi@ut.ac.ir

Abstract: (524 Views)

Enhancing the independence of the monetary authorities to mitigate inflationary bias is seen as a crucial political decision. Many countries, by adopting this approach, have assured their economies that controlling inflation and achieving macroeconomic stability are binding constraints for political authorities. Some countries enshrine such independence in their constitution, others through legislation related to the central bank, while some adhere to it in practice without any legal mandate. With the introduction of the new Central Bank Act, questions arise about whether this principle has been upheld. This study employs prominent independence measurement indicators, namely the Cukierman Index and the Grilli Index, to assess the Central Bank's independence under both the Monetary and Banking Act and the new Central Bank Act, as well as to compare it with other countries’ central banks’ independence. The results indicate that, compared to the Monetary and Banking Act, the new Central Bank Act has increased the Central Bank's independence by 16.6% based on the Grilli Index and by approximately 7% based on the Cukierman Index. However, despite these improvements, the legal independence of the Central Bank under the new act remains within the lowest 25% globally.

Keywords: Central Bank independence, Inflationary bias, Fiscal dominance, Central bank act

Full-Text [PDF 837 kb] (246 Downloads)

Type of Study: Research | Subject: Special

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khosravi M, Jamour M, Lotfi R. Measuring Iran Central Bank De jure Independence In New Act. qjerp 2025; 32 (112) :6-47
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