Finance and Banking, Faculty of Management and Accounting, Allameh Tabatabaei University (RA) , h_seilsepour@atu.ac.ir
Abstract: (9 Views)
The rapid growth of new financial technologies and the resulting complexities have made it necessary for regulators to utilize policy learning tools and controlled experiments. This study, focusing on regulatory sandboxes in Iran, examines the balance of interests among key players and adopts an integrated approach. In the first stage, through content analysis of official documents and policy reports, along with conducting 36 semi-structured interviews with experts, the main players, their strategic options, and institutional preferences were identified and formulated. Next, using the conflict resolution graph model and GMCR+ software, based on options, incompatibility rules, and sequential preferences, the space of possible states was drawn and their stability was assessed with criteria such as Nash equilibrium, general and symmetric meta-rationality, and sequential stability. The findings show that the existing equilibrium, despite strategic stability, does not have the necessary efficiency to facilitate innovation and realize open governance and is based more on institutional conservatism. Reverse game analysis indicates that the transition to the desired state requires reforming incentives, redesigning institutional constraints, and forming a coalition among key regulators. From a theoretical perspective, this research provides a reproducible framework for linking qualitative data with institutional equilibrium analysis and, from a policy perspective, proposes practical suggestions for strengthening participatory regulation in Iran's fintech ecosystem.
Seilsepour H, Norouzi A. Policymaking for Financial Sandboxes in Iran:
A Game Theory Approach. qjerp 2026; 34 (118) :110-162 URL: http://qjerp.ir/article-1-3812-en.html